Securing-Linux-Containers/README.md

# Securing Linux Containers

## Table of contents

<!--toc:start-->
- [Securing Linux Containers](#securing-linux-containers)
  - [Table of contents](#table-of-contents)
  - [Introduction](#introduction)
  - [Secrets](#secrets)
    - [Alternatives](#alternatives)
      - [Files](#files)
  - [Users and groups](#users-and-groups)
  - [Filesystem](#filesystem)
  - [Resources limits](#resources-limits)
  - [Network](#network)
  - [Images](#images)
    - [Building](#building)
    - [Scanning](#scanning)
  - [Selinux](#selinux)
<!--toc:end-->

## Introduction

This document is a collection of simple and very generic tips and best
practices related to seciurity of Linux containers. Contenerization is
considered safer by default, but then one can hear about discovered
vulnerabilities that are primarly bad for applications in containers
(Example: [CVE-2023-49103](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-49103)).
Tips and best practices collected here should help raise awarness about
how to keep containers really secure. Contents are kept container-engine
agnostic, but examples will be based on actual implementations (Podman, k8s).

## Secrets

Secret is the most vulnerable data, as it usually can open access to other
private data. They might also allow modification of the environment, which
means possibilities for further access or many other forms of attack.

> [!WARNING]
> Don't use environment variables for secrets

Container isolation made providing and managing secrets somewhat harder, as
they need to cross the additional barier. This casued the rather dangerous
trend of providing secrets among many other configuration data in form of
environment variables. At first sight it might look like good idea, but when
actually compared to other means of storing secrets it turns out that
environment variables might be much easier to access by attacker, than
for example arbitrary files. [CVE-2023-49103](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-49103)
is only an example of vulnerability which was considered to be more
dangerous for contenerized apps, because of the vulnerability
being based on gaining access to env variables.

### Alternatives

#### Files

Files with secrets are common and broadly supported. With proper setup they can
be also very secure.

- Keep configuration and secret files on entirely different path than other data
- If application runs main process under different user than worker processes
(which usually have direct contact with user interaction), the configuration
should not be readable by the worker process user.
- Depending on the technology used, storage of the secret files inside of a
container could be temporary/volatile. In kubernetes Secret objects are mounted
as tmpfs. Example for mounting secret as tmpfs in pod:

```yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: app
spec:
  containers:
  - name: app
    image: registry.fedoraproject.org/fedora-minimal:latest
    command: [ "sleep", "infinity" ]
    volumeMounts:
      - mountPath: /config
        name: config
  volumes:
  - name: config
    secret:
      secretName: config
```

This produces readonly tmpfs mount inside:

```bash
bash-5.2# df -h /config/
Filesystem      Size  Used Avail Use% Mounted on
tmpfs           4.8G  4.0K  4.8G   1% /config

bash-5.2# ls -la /config/
total 0
drwxrwxrwt. 3 root root 100 Nov  9 14:00 .
drwxr-xr-x. 1 root root  24 Nov  9 14:00 ..
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root  60 Nov  9 14:00 ..2024_11_09_14_00_47.4065932771
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root  32 Nov  9 14:00 ..data -> ..2024_11_09_14_00_47.4065932771
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root  18 Nov  9 14:00 secret.conf -> ..data/secret.conf
```

## Users and groups

## Filesystem

## Resources limits

## Network

## Images

### Building

### Scanning

## Selinux